Ideology and Violence in Civil Wars: Theory and Evidence from Mozambique and Angola

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Version of record first published: 04 Jan 2013.

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Theories that seek to explain patterns of violence in civil wars frequently pass over the issue of ideology. This paper argues that ideology may shape the use of selective versus indiscriminate violence by an armed group. The role of ideology is examined in the cases of Frelimo in Mozambique and the MPLA in Angola in their countries' wars of independence and civil wars. Using archival and newspaper data, I find that the Marxist–Leninist ideology of Frelimo and the MPLA led initially to their practice of restraint in violence against civilians, and that as elite ideological commitment eroded, this led to a corresponding increase in violence. I also challenge the role played by ideology in Jeremy Weinstein and Macartan Humphreys' group organization theory of civil war violence.

INTRODUCTION

Civil war tears the social fabric, contravening the ethical view that civilians should be immune from wartime violence.[1] Violence against civilians, while varying widely, is a universal feature of civil wars. Rebel groups and governments who have practiced indiscriminate violence against civilians have become subjects of wide popular and scholarly examination, and many studies have found increasing civilian victimization in the 20th century.[2]

Violence against civilians in civil wars is generally explained as a product of war strategy or resource availability. Civilians are attacked to terrorize, to deprive the enemy of support, for material gain, etc. However, in some cases, war strategy and policies about civilians may be determined by another source: group ideology. Recently, scholars have begun to look more closely at the issue of armed group ideology in civil wars and have found that ideology in fact plays a central role in determining the character of organizations and how they wage war.[3] In the case of restrained groups, who limit their violence against civilians and discriminate in target selection, a central ideology antithetical to indiscriminate violence against civilians may constrain fighters and prevent atrocities. This paper examines the effect ideology can have in shaping patterns of violence by armed groups and in restraining indiscriminate violence against civilians, and how shifts in ideology can lead to corresponding shifts in levels of violence.

In this paper, I focus on two cases: the *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (Frelimo) and the *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (MPLA). Both

groups fought long and ultimately successful wars of independence against their Portuguese colonial rulers;[4] both took control of the government at independence; both then had to fight long, internationalized civil wars against domestic insurgents and their allies;[5] and both became less restrained in their use of violence against civilians as counterinsurgents, which I argue occurred due to ideological shifts, though they remained significantly less violent than their insurgent opponents. Examining groups that fought both as insurgents and incumbents allows us to formulate theories about violence against civilians that may be applicable to groups fighting on either side of a civil war.

After discussing key terms and concepts, I examine the work of Jeremy Weinstein and Macartan Humphreys,[6] whose theories of civil war violence include ideology, but characterize it as a product of resource availability. I present an alternative argument that ideology, independent of economic factors, can shape armed groups' patterns of violence. I then present data on Frelimo's and the MPLA's practice of violence against civilians in Mozambique and Angola's independence and civil wars, and demonstrate how these data are consistent with my theory.

CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS

Following Kalyvas's definition, *civil war* is 'armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of hostilities'.[7] *Civilians* or *noncombatants* 'do not participate in armed conflict by fighting, carrying weapons, or serving in the uniformed military or security services'.[8]

Violence against civilians, or simply *violence*, in civil war occurs when an armed group party to the conflict intentionally harms noncombatants. Armed groups practice a repertoire of violence[9] that may include killing, wounding, kidnapping, sexual violence, assault, property destruction, forced displacement, etc. I include within this category forms of violence that may have psychological rather than bodily impact on the victim, such as property destruction and violent threatening. *Restraint* is the policy and practice of an armed group curtailing indiscriminate violence against civilians and seeking to limit its discriminate violence in brutality and quantity. Restrained groups would thus be sincere in their claims that, in Slim's words: 'It is neither their intention nor their desire to kill civilians. Whenever they attack, they claim to be primarily concerned with military targets and do all they can to take precautions against hitting and hurting civilians'.[10]

Ideology has been defined in countless ways.[11] Here I use it to mean a 'coherent and relatively stable set of beliefs or values'[12] through which people 'posit, explain and justify ends and means of organised social action, and specifically political action, irrespective of whether such action aims to preserve, amend, uproot or rebuild a given social order'.[13]

GROUP ORGANIZATION, IDEOLOGY, AND CIVIL WAR VIOLENCE

Existing theories of violence against civilians in civil wars tend to ignore the role of ideology in determining whether groups practice targeted or indiscriminate violence. In those theories that do include ideology, it is generally treated as a secondary factor, dependent on resources or other strategic concerns.

One of the most influential recent theories,[14] and one of the only theories to account for ideology, is the group organization theory advanced by Weinstein, independently and in association with Humphreys, who argues that violence is a function of internal group structures and the ideology of the group or lack thereof. Humphreys and Weinstein[15] argue that violence can be used to extract benefits from civilian populations, and in groups without effective internal policing mechanisms members will 'overemploy violence for their individual gain', with policing ability determined by (a) the preferences and goal-orientation of members (longer-term gains versus short-term consumption), (b) internal group structures to enforce compliance and sanction defectors,[16] and (c) the level of ethnic fragmentation in the group. However, they do not distinguish between selective and indiscriminate violence. This is a key omission, as a group could have long-term goals and strong disciplinary structures but still commit large-scale selective violence, as in the US military's Phoenix Program of targeted assassinations during the Vietnam War.[17]

Weinstein argues that these dynamics of violence stem from the resources available to insurgent groups, which determine the motivations of their recruits.[18] Well-endowed groups with access to extractive resources or foreign sponsorship attract opportunistic recruits interested in short-term material gain, who oppose control mechanisms that would impinge upon their accumulation and thus engage in indiscriminate violence. Groups with a low resource endowment recruit members on the basis of grievances and ideological commitment to a long-term project, ensuring that recruits will use violence selectively and maintain civilian support. This theoretical formulation, however, is based on the assumption that the path of an insurgent group will be determined on a rational choice basis depending on its resource endowment, proscribing the possibility of ideals holding a greater inherent allure than material gain. In application to both insurgent *and* state forces,[19] I would argue, such an assumption of rationality (leading to path dependence) is belied by Mike McGovern's point that 'participants in violent politics [operate] according to rational and irrational choice models at once',[20] leading to the possibility that ideology may be valued over resources, rather than dependent upon them, and that ideology in and of itself may be a mechanism shaping practices of violence.

AN ALTERNATIVE ARGUMENT: THE POWER OF IDEOLOGY

When an armed group is built around an overarching ideology, this ideology can shape the patterns of violence in which it engages, especially with regard to civilians. In some cases, ideology may lead a group to be more selective and restrained in its targeting of civilians. Drake found ideology to determine terrorist

groups' target selection, while leftist and other nonreligious ideological commitments have been found by Asal and Rethemeyer to be significant in terrorist groups' decisions not to commit lethal attacks.[21] In South Africa, Goodwin found that while theories of terrorism would have expected the African National Congress to engage in terrorist attacks against the population of 'complicitous' white civilians, an ideology of 'nonracial internationalism' restrained the group and forestalled such terrorism.[22] These findings, however, have not been significantly explored in relation to violence in civil wars.

Most frequently, ideological commitment is strongest among elites in an organization, while lay members are more self-interested[23] and adhere to 'only fragments of [the] larger ideology'.[24] The political and military leadership of a group attempts to instill ideological commitment among ground-level forces through a process of indoctrination and training, or 'military socialization'.[25] A breakdown in ideological commitment among elites will result in a loss of ideology's effects among lower-level individuals through indiscriminate recruitment, a failure to socialize recruits, and a loss of discipline as leaders set ideologically inconsistent examples. Thus, if a group is committed to an ideology that promotes restraint, we should expect to see (a) an emphasis on civilian protection in discourse and training; and (b) a diminution of ideological commitment to result in increased, more indiscriminate violence.

In the cases of Frelimo and the MPLA, nonracialist, anti-imperialist ideologies that evolved into commitment to Marxism–Leninism led the groups to be initially restrained in their perpetration of violence against civilians, using primarily targeted, rather than indiscriminate, violence.[26] Both groups existed as sociopolitical entities prior to militarizing, so they already had some popular support and ideological underpinnings before evolving into insurgents. When they did take up arms, Frelimo and the MPLA indoctrinated cadres with their collectivist ideologies in order to instill discipline and, as in other Marxist–Leninist groups, to subordinate individual interests to ideological goals,[27] with Frelimo's Centre for Political and Military Training described by leader Samora Machel as a place 'not to produce "killers", but to train true revolutionary fighters'.[28] The groups opposed the racism and repression of the Portuguese colonial regime by emphasizing inclusion and freedom for all Angolans and Mozambicans, regardless of race or ethnicity. Simple national liberation may have been the goal of many cadres, but the Marxism–Leninism of the leaders shaped the groups.[29]

This message of unity was reflected in the attempt to wage 'people's wars', a strategy that demands 'avoidance of violence against the people by the liberation forces'.[30] Marxism–Leninism provided a more organized ideological framework for the battle against imperial oppression, a call for 'social harmony and widespread popular participation'.[31] This dictated a strategy for Frelimo and the MPLA of maintaining good relations with the population in both the wars of independence and the civil wars, curtailing violence against civilians. Kalyvas and Balcells found that Marxist–Leninist groups during the Cold War, such as Frelimo and the MPLA, engaged in a particular form of 'robust insurgency', with revolutionary ideals and a

goal of mass mobilization and governing territory in accordance with their ideology.[32] While Marxist–Leninist insurgent and national liberation groups during the Cold War engaged in longer wars with more battle deaths, they were also characterized by a high degree of discipline.[33] Wood has found that Marxist–Leninist groups are often more restrained in their use of sexual violence;[34] in the cases of Frelimo and the MPLA, I argue that each group's specific ideology[35] initially promoted restraint across the spectrum, leading violence against civilians to be targeted mainly against those actively opposing the groups, before becoming more indiscriminate as ideological commitment waned.

Balcells challenges Humphreys and Weinstein and Weinstein by arguing that levels and targets of violence may be determined not by organizational factors, but by prewar political/ideological identities of civilians.[36] Where this is the case, I would argue, though, that individuals' identities only mark them for targeting by an armed group if they are opposed by that armed group's own identity.

Theories that attempt to explain violence by reference to features of war itself – population control, resource extraction, battle losses, etc. – may be appropriate in other cases, but are inadequate for predicting observed levels of violence against civilians by Frelimo and the MPLA. Only by examining these groups' ideological commitment and shifts in it over time can we understand the overall pattern of restraint and variations in the violence against civilians that was committed.

DATA COLLECTION

There is a paucity of good data on violence against civilians by Frelimo and the MPLA both as rebel groups and as governments. In their independence and civil wars, both groups were less violent toward civilians than their opponents, so Frelimo and MPLA abuses have received less attention. My own primary research on Frelimo and the MPLA was conducted at the Portuguese Directorate General of Archives in Lisbon, examining declassified documents of the Portuguese international secret police, the *Direcção Geral de Segurança* (DGS), regarding Frelimo[37] and MPLA[38] activities during the independence wars.

While the use of newspaper data in studies of violence is increasingly common, many scholars have been critical of this turn. Newspapers have a selection bias, 'choosing only particular stories to report', and 'disproportionaly [*sic*] report violent and large events',[39] and may also be subject to description bias, incorrectly reporting covered events.[40] Given press censorship under the Salazar-Caetano dictatorship in Portugal, I felt newspapers would be less reliable sources, but classified intelligence documents would provide more accurate information to complement the more numerous newspaper accounts. The data compiled are certainly not complete, but given the strength of the Portuguese intelligence network,[41] the sample should reflect the larger patterns of Frelimo violence. Portuguese media reports or public government documents would have conflicting incentives to exaggerate of insurgent violence to demonize insurgents and also to underreport insurgent violence to maintain an appearance of control in the colonies. The DGS documents were

confidential, however, so while they only provide a snapshot of Frelimo and MPLA violence in the independence wars and DGS officials in the colonies may have withheld information from Lisbon to cover up their own ineptitude in combating the insurgencies, we should still expect DGS reports to be more unfiltered than public information of that era.

Individual incidents of violence against civilians were isolated across a spectrum of violence including killing, wounding, torture, kidnapping, assault, property destruction, robbery, forced displacement, forced recruitment, and violent threatening. More complete data are available on Frelimo violence against civilians, but reports of MPLA violations are scarcer. DGS data collection in Angola was hampered by simultaneously fighting three insurgent groups with overlapping territories, leading to many reports of attacks by militants of unknown affiliation. Due to this limitation, DGS accounts of MPLA violence against civilians are used more as anecdotal illustrations. For data on Frelimo violence against civilians during the Mozambican civil war, I use a dataset constructed by Weinstein.[42] Weinstein recorded incidents across a repertoire of violence including killing, injuring, mutilation, kidnapping, raping, detention, arson, looting, and forced displacement reported in government newspapers and periodicals during the civil war. On MPLA violence against civilians in the Angolan civil war, I use Ziemke's dataset.[43] Ziemke used Portuguese and foreign news accounts to track 'one-sided violence', defined as 'all activity where either rebel or government actors perpetrated violence upon unarmed people/civilians. Violence includes injury or killings, etc'.[44] While there persist the problems with newspaper datasets mentioned above (and one would expect the government newspapers in Weinstein's sample to limit reporting of Frelimo violence), these remain the best sources of quantitative information about these civil wars.

VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIANS

Frelimo and the MPLA came into being as nonviolent groups. When they did decide to begin armed struggle, they were outnumbered militarily, technologically inferior, and faced an extremely well-developed spy network. As this structural imbalance and their ideologies demanded a war effort on the basis of popular support, how did the groups manage and moderate their violence against civilians?

Frelimo

Frelimo was formed on 25 June 1962, demanding independence from Portugal and seeking to include people of all races and ethnicities in its struggle. The group's first leader, Eduardo Mondlane, was committed to socialism, but the adoption of Marxism–Leninism was solidified after Mondlane's 1969 assassination under the leadership of Samora Machel, who was committed to making Mozambique 'Africa's first Marxist state'.[45]

Frelimo first tried nonviolent action within the colonial system, and was successful in forging relationships with the population, but in the face of Portuguese

intransigence, the group turned to armed struggle. From the beginning, the protection of civilians and the preservation of popular support were emphasized. As Munslow found, 'A standing order given to all militants was this: "Respect the people, help the people, defend the people." People's war demands the closest relationship between the guerrillas and the population in a symbiosis of mutual support. Abuses of power by the guerrillas would quickly result in betrayal to the colonial army'.[46] Thus, Frelimo stressed discipline, cohesion, and a sense of justice when training cadres.[47]

After ineffective and limited operations, Frelimo began to gain traction in 1966, and by 1967 Portugal was admitting to suffering casualties and territory loss and began grouping civilians into fortified collective villages, called *aldeamentos*, for defense. Fighting effectively stalemated in the early 1970s, as Frelimo entrenched itself in the south of the country, launching economically disruptive attacks, but unable to directly challenge Portuguese forces. During this period, Frelimo began implementing a program of socialist collectivization and modernization in areas under its control, beginning the socioeconomic portion of its revolution; its experiences in these 'liberated zones' shaped its policies after independence.[48] The military standoff was finally broken in 1974 by the coup in Portugal that toppled the Salazar-Caetano regime, leading to Mozambique's independence.

Some early Frelimo leaders sought an exclusionary black nationalist program and advocated for urban terrorism, peasant attacks on Portuguese settlers, and execution of captured Portuguese soldiers,[49] but the social revolutionary faction won out and shaped Frelimo policy. Frelimo leadership battled against Portuguese attempts to use religious and ethnic differences to divide the population,[50] instituted policies of clemency for captured Portuguese soldiers, and continually reminded cadres not to confuse the Portuguese people, 'our ally', with their dictatorial government.[51] As Samora Machel said in 1972, 'Since the beginning we have said our struggle is not against the Portuguese people but against Portuguese colonialism', but added the caveat that 'if those people co-operate with the colonial authorities against us we have to take action against them. We do the same with Mozambicans'.[52] These were the official policies, but were they followed on the ground?

In the archives of the DGS, I searched through the files on Frelimo activity and found reports on 278 separate incidents of violence against civilians committed by Frelimo forces during the independence war. I have disaggregated these incidents by the types of violence that occurred within attacks, since many incidents included multiple forms of violence (see Table 1).

Kidnapping was the most prevalent form of direct physical violence; this reflects Frelimo leaders' conviction that civilians needed to be away from Portuguese control to effectively combat the colonial system and indoctrinate the population. Frelimo attempted to create alliances with traditional leaders and officials appointed by the Portuguese, believing their 'ancestral influence' could be used to draw more people to the movement.[53] If these leaders rejected Frelimo and continued to actively support the Portuguese, they were seen as inimical to the revolutionary cause and

TABLE 1
FRELIMO REPERTOIRE OF VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIANS IN INDEPENDENCE WAR
(1964–74)

Type of violence	Number of reported occurrences
Killing	68
Torture	3
Wounding	84
Kidnapping	110
Property destruction	56
Robbery	34
Violent threatening	5
Forced recruitment	1
Forced displacement	2
Assault	3
Rape	0

Note: Number of occurrences means the number of incidents in which this type of violence occurred, not the number of victims.

thus legitimate targets of violence. Especially in 1964, Portuguese reports emphasize that authorities who were killed or wounded were targeted for their refusal to support Frelimo and their loyalty to the Portuguese, with a list provided of 21 leaders or their associates killed in that year,[54] but this pattern of attacks against opposing authority figures continued throughout the war.

The Portuguese consolidation of civilians into aldeamentos made it difficult to access the population, so the aldeamentos were frequently attacked. Many attacks were 'ineffectual' random shelling,[55] but when Frelimo did penetrate the perimeters of aldeamentos, large groups of civilians were taken away with them. Civilians were killed and wounded during attacks on aldeamentos, but the taking of people, glossed as 'liberation' by Frelimo and 'kidnapping' by the Portuguese, was the central goal. For instance, on 30 November 1973, an estimated 200 Frelimo soldiers attacked Aldeamento Anli-Ancuabe, kidnapping 40–50 villagers and burning half the houses, yet only one woman was wounded, and the Portuguese report specifically notes that Frelimo took care to avoid harming civilians.[56] When civilians later returned to Portuguese-controlled areas, they almost certainly had been kidnapped; however, some civilians were likely happy to leave the fortified villages with Frelimo, as conditions were especially harsh in aldeamentos in contested territory.[57]

Frelimo soldiers generally did not employ particularly brutal forms of violence, like mutilation, and there are only three accounts of torture by Frelimo, with five total victims, in the DGS documents,[58] though torture was notoriously practiced by the Portuguese.[59] While there were no specific instances of rape by Frelimo in the DGS documents, the Portuguese alleged that Frelimo committed rapes,[60] and an internal review by Frelimo in 1968 mentions rape by some soldiers allegedly unable to withstand the 'privations of war'.[61] In response and to prevent further abuses, the Frelimo Defense Department recommended the creation of a Disciplinary Committee and Military Tribunal, in keeping with the group's highly organized

and bureaucratic structure.[62] However, while rape is rare in some conflicts,[63] underreporting is endemic to sexual violence, so the true level of sexual violence Frelimo committed cannot be ascertained.

Attacks on aldeamentos increased late in the war, and 1973 was the most violent year in the DGS data, with 111 recorded attacks against civilians. Yet Frelimo's violence against civilians still did not take on racial dimensions. In February 1974, rioting broke out among whites in Beira, who accused the Portuguese government of failing to protect them, 'although Frelimo had scrupulously avoided attacks on white settlers for most of the war'.[64] Race riots occurred in September and October 1974, with murders committed by both blacks and whites, but Frelimo acted to stop attackers, rather than joining in.[65]

In the lead-up to independence, numerous groups sought stakes in the future government, but the Portuguese ignored them and handed over power to Frelimo upon independence on 25 June 1975. Once in power, Frelimo rounded up many native opposition leaders, who were sent to reeducation camps or executed, but there was no widespread targeting of people who had served the Portuguese. Following its ideology, Frelimo began to implement nationwide the socialist policies with which it had experimented in the liberated zones, attempting to shift the rural economy to collective agriculture. The Portuguese aldeamentos had disintegrated, but Frelimo created its own villagization program, relocating citizens to government-organized collective villages, sometimes destroying their original homes and arresting those who resisted, occasionally threatening them with death.[66] Traditional authorities, considered potentially useful during the independence war, became enemies of the revolution. This was part of a larger antagonism between Frelimo's 'scientific socialism' and traditional structures of Mozambican society, including tribal chiefs and spiritual healers and mediums,[67] whose repression bred great resentment against the new government.

There was discontent in some areas over villagization, and villagers were relocated by force, but in other areas it was accepted.[68] Henriksen wrote, 'The abrogation of some human rights notwithstanding, Mozambique's social restructuring and development processes have not resulted in the crudity and brutality characteristic of the forced evacuation of Cambodian cities or even of Tanzanian villagization. To date, there have been no reports of refugees moving across the borders with tales of a reign of terror. The emphasis appears to be on politicization, not liquidation of the workers' enemies'.[69] There was little violent resistance to Frelimo policies from those Mozambicans being directly affected,[70] despite ethnic and regional biases within the party and its policies.[71] Organized, militarized resistance was instead nurtured by foreign intervention.[72]

In response to sanctuary given in Mozambique to rebels fighting the white-minority regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia, and to destabilize the Frelimo government, Rhodesia's Central Intelligence Organization organized a group of Portuguese former settlers and Frelimo outcasts into the *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (Renamo), which attacked Zimbabwe Africa National Union camps and Frelimo installations within Mozambique. Renamo remained subservient to

Rhodesia until 1980, when the white-dominated regime ended and the group came under South African management.

As Renamo attacks escalated with South African patronage, Frelimo began wider counterinsurgency operations. The villagization program was now envisioned like the aldeamentos: a means to concentrate and monitor the population, and deprive the enemy of access. The state apparatus also came to be used repressively, as the criminal justice system became corrupted and violent, with executions of political prisoners and increased detention of dissidents in reeducation camps, where beatings, torture, and some deaths were reported.[73] However, Frelimo recognized that the justice system was out of control and becoming oppressive like the Portuguese administration, so in 1981 Machel began a 'legality offensive' that decried arbitrary detention, torture, and other abuses, and led to thousands of security sector personnel being transferred, fired, or prosecuted.

In the field, Frelimo abuses during the civil war were rare, certainly compared to Renamo's brutality, but while abuses may not have been officially sanctioned, they were not absent. Frelimo sometimes did not distinguish between Renamo militants and civilians who had been under their control; for example, President Machel said in 1983, 'Those who deal with the bandits will die with the bandits'.[74] This attitude manifested itself in the execution of former police officers in areas captured from Renamo and in indiscriminate bombing of Renamo-held villages in the late 1980s.[75] Also, rural civilians found outside of collective villages were frequently subjected to violence, especially if they had been in Renamo-controlled areas.[76] In Zambezia Province, a Renamo stronghold, in the early 1980s, 'doctors and priests complained about the killing of innocent civilians [by Frelimo]'[77] and a former Frelimo military officer described engaging in 'scorched earth operations'.[78] In Mossurize, another area of strong Renamo support, people blamed Frelimo forces for beatings and killings.[79] However, despite the dominance of the Ndau ethnic group in Renamo, the Ndau population at large was not viewed as the enemy by Frelimo, and Ndau serving in the government army did not draw suspicion.[80]

In the mid-1980s, as the war continued, the Mozambican economy collapsed. Troops were inadequately supplied and indiscipline and violence increased, with soldiers robbing civilians and even killing witnesses.[81] Frelimo discovered the truth of Sukhanov's critique during the Russian Revolution that 'those hungry, frightened and not politically conscious soldiers posed as great a threat to the revolution as did the organized forces of tsarism'.[82] Frelimo's Marxist–Leninist ideals had been slowly receding throughout the 1980s as the economy was liberalized to gain foreign aid, but this culminated in the 5th Party Congress of 1989, when 'all references to Marxism–Leninism and the Soviet bloc countries were carefully removed, along with any associated phrases such as "proletarian internationalism" and "scientific socialism"'.[83]

Overall, as in the independence war, Frelimo committed much less violence against civilians than its enemy. Weinstein's dataset lists 78 incidents of violence against civilians by the government *Forças Armadas de Moçambique*, police forces, and 'Frelimo',[84] which are disaggregated by type of violence (see Table 2).[85] While

TABLE 2
FRELIMO VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIANS BY TYPE IN THE CIVIL WAR (1976–94)

| Type of violence	Number of occurrences
Killing	22
Mutilation	0
Kidnapping	4
Detention	20
Injury	24
Arson	1
Rape	3
Looting	35
Forced displacement	0

Note: Weinstein (note 6).

Renamo was notorious for mutilations and violence, Weinstein found Frelimo was responsible for only 7 per cent of attacks against civilians during the civil war.[86] This is supported by Gersony, who, in 196 interviews with refugees, found no mutilations or brutal forms of killing attributed to Frelimo, and Frelimo implicated in only 3 per cent of the murders witnessed by subjects, compared to 94 per cent for Renamo.[87]

Weinstein found Frelimo violence increasing late in the war, with over 90 per cent of attacks against civilians occurring after 1990 (see Figure 1). This increase in violence occurred as Frelimo turned from an ideologically indoctrinated volunteer army to conscripted, undisciplined troops, who were not conscious of the social

FIGURE 1
RESPONSIBILITY FOR VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIANS IN THE MOZAMBICAN CIVIL
WAR.[137]

transformational goals on which Frelimo was originally based. Corruption, once strongly contained, ran rampant, and even Cahen, who consistently criticized Frelimo as 'non-socialist', acknowledged a definitive change in the organization, writing that a shift had occurred in 'the social character of the elite in power: taking over the government when it was still entirely cut off from the means of production and exchange, when it saw with anger other more business-oriented fractions rival it, it consists today of persons who are concerned to feather their own nests and are often simply corrupt'.[88]

The war drew to a close with the October 1992 Rome Accord. Renamo has since grudgingly settled into its role as an opposition political party. While there was still some violence by both parties in 1993 and 1994,[89] Mozambique has since remained peaceful, unlike its fellow former colony, Angola, which saw a similar pattern of restraint receding as ideological commitment waned.

MPLA

The MPLA was founded in late 1956 by a diverse group of whites, *mestiços*, and blacks, arising out of an earlier Angolan independence group that had strong Communist ties.[90] In 1962, the MPLA reorganized, proclaiming a new program for independence, but also stating a desire for redistributive economic reforms. The group was 'from its inception strongly (orthodox) Marxist',[91] but leader Agostinho Neto maintained an expressed desire for a unity of pro-independence forces and recognized the need to adapt ideological goals to the Angolan context.[92]

The MPLA claimed responsibility for directing a riot on 4 February 1961, in which Angolan nationalists attacked a prison in the capital, Luanda. However, it remained largely uninvolved in the violence that erupted in northern Angola after the riot, when Africans led by Holden Roberto, the future leader of the *Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola* (FNLA), killed hundreds of white settlers, followed by massive settler and Portuguese military reprisals. The MPLA bided its time, pursuing more controlled popular mobilization until 1963, when it began guerrilla operations in the enclave of Cabinda. The group commenced attacks throughout Angola in 1964, and by 1966 had carved out limited areas of control in which it began to implement its socialist programs.[93]

During this time, the MPLA was also fighting the black nationalist FNLA, which was supported mainly by the Bakongo.[94] A third rebel group, the *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* (UNITA), led by Jonas Savimbi, formed in 1966. UNITA was also an ethnic movement, based among the Ovimbundu, and its black nationalism branded mestiços as collaborators. The MPLA was conceived as an organization to unite the Angolan people, presenting itself as color-blind, though it too had an ethnic basis, with support concentrated among the Mbundu and mestiços.[95] Its propaganda specifically stated that unarmed whites were not the enemy and were not to be harmed and embraced mestiços and *asimilados*, assimilated blacks.[96] This policy appears to have been followed on the ground, as the FNLA (not the MPLA) was notorious for attacking whites. MPLA racial tolerance was noted by whites early in the war: in 1962, whites in Luanda were spreading the

story of a white truck driver stopped by the MPLA; he was forced to unload his cargo, but was paid for the goods and told that the group did not harm whites and only wanted to prevent supply deliveries to the Portuguese military.[97]

As in Mozambique, the Portuguese attempted to isolate the population in aldeamentos. In combination with internecine fighting with the FNLA and UNITA, this prevented the MPLA from consolidating extensive liberated areas. To compete in this 'war for people',[98] the MPLA forced civilians to leave their villages, and sought to 'liberate' civilians from the aldeamentos.

Other than forced resettlement, the main form of violence against civilians perpetrated by the MPLA during the independence war was execution of alleged traitors. Attempts to escape MPLA control were viewed as treasonous endorsement of the Portuguese and were often punished with execution.[99] There were usually trials, and MPLA leadership warned against summary executions,[100] but they still occurred. Executions increased as the war dragged on, but also became more precise as the MPLA developed closer ties with the population and thus gained more accurate knowledge of who was an 'enemy'.[101] Further, in 1969, the MPLA created a commission to investigate executions without trial and another to examine 'mistreatment of the populace by combatants'.[102] Despite these measures, Portuguese intelligence documents do report numerous instances of violence against civilians during attacks on villages. In these attacks, local administrators were particularly at risk if they opposed MPLA policies, and they were subjected to imprisonment and sometimes physical violence.[103]

MPLA leaders, however, issued frequent directives not to attack civilians, and according to DGS commentary, in 1970, MPLA orders 'rigorously prohibited any violent actions against the population, ordering, at the same time, a campaign of *mentalização*[104] to capture' the hearts and minds of the people.[105] Unauthorized attacks on civilians were condemned,[106] and in one case a commander personally intervened to free a man wrongfully captured and beaten by MPLA forces.[107] Overall, the MPLA was more focused on attacking Portuguese forces, with secret Portuguese documents attributing 'nearly two-thirds of all guerrilla attacks to the MPLA and over a third to the FNLA, but just 4% to UNITA'.[108] We may view the MPLA during the independence war as restrained not only in comparison to the FNLA, but also to Portuguese forces, who beat and brutally killed civilians.[109]

After the coup in Portugal, leaders of the three independence groups met in January 1975 and agreed to a transitional government with equal representation. The agreement collapsed, though, and as independence day, 11 November 1975, grew near, fighting intensified. The MPLA was determined to maintain control of Luanda, correctly assuming that whichever group controlled the capital would be recognized as the Angolan government. It succeeded, and was recognized by a number of countries as the legitimate government; no country recognized UNITA or the FNLA's claims to power.[110] A large Cuban force intervened on behalf of the MPLA, taking up frontline combat roles against the FNLA (until its collapse in 1976) and UNITA, which was bolstered by South African troops.

The MPLA turned toward repression to consolidate its power and implement its social and economic programs, its actions having the combined goals of counterinsurgency and state transformation. UNITA and the FNLA were outlawed and the MPLA purged itself, with a number of members either imprisoned or killed.[111] As in Mozambique, political prisoners faced death sentences and some were tortured.[112] However, despite the ethnic bases of the FNLA and UNITA, 'ethnicity was *not* the salient cleavage driving wartime patterns, nor were the vast majority of civilian targets selected on the basis of their ethnic identity'.[113]

As in the independence war, the MPLA's most widespread abuse of civilians involved forced resettlement in efforts to establish socialist collective villages. In the mid-1980s, the MPLA became increasingly coercive in its villagization programs, engaged in indiscriminate bombing, and severely punished draft dodgers. Draft evasion led to forced conscription, meaning that unlike in the independence war, fighters were not ideologically motivated or indoctrinated and those motivated by greed, who would previously have been kept out of the group,[114] were now folded into MPLA forces.

This was symptomatic of a larger shift within the MPLA. At independence, the MPLA was a closely controlled party, with corruption 'severely punished',[115] but leaders within the government began to retreat from their ideological commitment. As Ziemke writes, 'Over time, the ideals of Marxism, nationalization, and socialism by MPLA elites receded and the rawest form of capitalism [was] embraced for the way in which it could line their pockets'.[116] Hodges likewise saw corruption and cronyism developing in the late 1980s and early 1990s 'in an ideological and moral void, left by the abandonment of Marxism-Leninism'.[117]

As ideology receded, so did restraint. MPLA violence increased later in the war, culminating in the 1992 massacre of suspected UNITA supporters around Luanda by MPLA forces and government-armed civilian militias in which over 1,000 people were killed following the resumption of hostilities after disputed elections.[118] Government security forces operated with increasing lawlessness from 1992 onward, yet UNITA remained responsible for the majority of atrocities (see Table 3).

TABLE 3
PERCENTAGE OF ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS BY ACTOR IN THE ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR

Years	MPLA	UNITA	South Africa	Other/unknown
1975–80	N/A	N/A	79%	N/A
1981–85	0%	38%	62%	0%
1986–90	5%[a]	90%	5%	0%
1991–95	26%	56%	N/A[b]	16%
1996–2000	18%	61%	N/A	21%
2001–2002	32%	63%	N/A	5%

Note: Ziemke (note 43) pp.123–5.
[a] This figure is for both MPLA and Cuban forces.
[b] South Africa withdrew in 1988.

TABLE 4
RESPONSIBILITY FOR ATROCITIES IN THE ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR, JANUARY 1995–APRIL
2002

Actor	Number of atrocities	Percentage of atrocities	Number of killings	Percentage of killings
UNITA	53	77.9	1674	88.2
MPLA	4	5.9	59	3.1
Unknown	10	14.7	148[a]	7.8
Other	1	1.5	16	0.8
Total	68		1897	

Note: Schrodt and Ulfelder (note 120).
[a] In one event, the number of victims killed was listed as 'many', so the minimum possible victims, five, are included.

Of the 1,073 total incidents of one-sided violence[119] in Ziemke's dataset, the MPLA was responsible for 180 incidents (16.8 per cent), with their allies responsible for an additional 41 incidents (3.8 per cent). The finding of the MPLA being relatively less violent is supported by the Political Instability Task Force Worldwide Atrocities Dataset, which tracks events in which five or more civilians were killed, beginning in January 1995.[120] Isolating incidents during the civil war from January 1995 until its end in April 2002, after Savimbi was killed, it is clear that UNITA was responsible for the majority of reported atrocities and total civilian deaths in this period (see Table 4).[121]

Thus, while the MPLA was responsible for higher levels of violence against civilians than Frelimo, it was relatively restrained in violence against civilians compared to the Portuguese, FNLA, UNITA, and South Africans.[122] It was in the last decade of the civil war, when ideological commitment had given way to kleptocracy, that MPLA attacks on civilians increased.

CONCLUSION

In the cases of both Frelimo and the MPLA, I find that violence against civilians was initially shaped by Marxist–Leninist ideologies demanding civilian support. Violence was used against civilians who supported and worked with the enemy and those who presented a barrier to desired Marxist–Leninist social transformations. During both civil wars, violence against civilians increased during the later years as leaders retreated from Marxist–Leninist ideals and troops were not ideologically motivated or indoctrinated.[123] This breakdown of ideological commitment at the elite level led to a 'transformation of social networks'[124] at the local level, with soldiers becoming more violent and predatory, as opposed to the earlier pattern of ideologically based selective violence, for instance the targeting of leaders who dissented or supported the opposition and coercion in attempts to realize villagization projects.

The findings presented in this paper challenge Weinstein and Humphreys' group organization theory.[125] The adoption of an ideology may be a strategic decision, but

it was not one made lightly by Frelimo and the MPLA, whose original adherence to Marxism–Leninism was sincere and based on the social ideals of the organizations' intellectual founding leaders, rather than a lack of resources. In fact, Marxism–Leninism opened up greater resources to the groups through the assistance they received from their Eastern Bloc ideological brethren, enabling them to wage 'robust insurgencies'.[126] This ideology was also what led to the organizations' systems of indoctrination and discipline, which managed to be effective despite the ethnic diversity of the groups. In Mozambique, violence increased in the 1980s as ideological commitment declined and the Frelimo government was sorely lacking in resources.

Theories that ethnic cleavages will shape patterns of violence in civil wars[127] are not supported in the cases of Frelimo and the MPLA. Despite the ethnic bases of their opponents, these groups did not engage in widespread targeting of coethnic civilians. I find some support for theories of irregular warfare and territorial contestation. The massacre of civilian suspected UNITA supporters in 1992 in Angola fits with the prediction that governments will use indiscriminate violence against civilians to disperse potential supporters of insurgencies and attack rebels' social capital.[128] Both Frelimo and the MPLA appear to have engaged in greater indiscriminate violence in contested areas where they could still project force, such as Frelimo killings of former police officers in areas captured from Renamo and indiscriminate bombing raids of Renamo-controlled areas, following Kalyvas's logic of violence.[129] While the selective violence in areas of firm Frelimo and MPLA control in the civil wars also appears to have followed this model, it is important to note that much of this violence was carried out through the use of judicial organs of the state; thus selective violence by governments in civil wars may be camouflaged under a veneer of state legitimacy. The idea that violence is more likely to occur in areas under the control of a group losing battles and territory, using 'force and fear as poor substitutes for [lost] legitimacy',[130] or to impose extra costs on its opponent,[131] may be partially supported by the increase in violence in later years of the civil wars. Frelimo and the MPLA, however, also engaged in greater violence against civilians for reasons of ideologically driven social transformation and political power consolidation precisely at times when they had achieved their greatest victories – gaining political power and, in the case of the MPLA, after winning the 1992 elections.

The role of ideology may overarch these other theories as changes in the level of ideological commitment of Frelimo and MPLA leadership and recruits were clearly correlated with shifts in their patterns of violence against civilians. Ideology is present not only in thought or discourse, but also in behavior. Recruitment strategies and structures of command and control, the focus of some other theories of violence against civilians, are of great importance, but for Frelimo and the MPLA these were shaped by ideology, and they transformed as the groups progressed from ideological commitment to civilian protection onward to corruption and abandonment of Marxism–Leninism in favor of a less coherent, frequently shifting system of economic liberalism and competitive authoritarianism.

To establish causation beyond the correlation and to more accurately determine the relationship between ideology and other factors posited as determinants of patterns of violence, additional research is needed on how ideology translated into action for Frelimo and the MPLA and the structures of dissemination of political ideals from the elite level to soldiers on the ground. This research, ideally conducted through interviews with or surveys of officials and ex-combatants, would provide a more nuanced understanding of the mechanisms through which ideology can act to restrain violence.[132]

A logical comparative case would be the *Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional* in Nicaragua, a group whose *Sandinismo* ideology incorporated Marxism–Leninism and elements of liberation theology, which also successfully captured the state, but once in power and attempting to consolidate its socialist revolution fought a counter-insurgency against externally backed rebels. Exploring the patterns of ideological commitment and violence against civilians in the Sandinista case would also allow us to test whether the theory is applicable beyond anti-colonial nationalist groups.

More broadly, this current work emphasizes the importance of examining violence against civilians in cases where armed groups practice restraint. The extremes of violence capture attention, but if we desire less violence, it is equally necessary to study groups who do not reach such extremes and to isolate the factors behind their restraint. If ideological commitment can restrain violence against civilians, policymakers should study the statements and actions of armed groups to attempt to determine their sincerity and whether their ideology highly values popular support and a larger project of social equality and improvement. This social orientation is most visible in policies toward populations within groups' occupied territory, as sustained control requires a mutual understanding, and 'terror against one's own citizenry is an especially serious violation of the implicit social contract'.[133] Groups routinely violating this social contract should be isolated and sanctioned, as they are more likely fighting for material gain. By contrast, restrained groups are more likely to provide long-term stability and peace,[134] and to maintain popular support, as Frelimo's and the MPLA's continued electoral successes show.[135] Ideologically committed rebel groups may also be more willing to negotiate settlements in exchange for sociopolitical concessions,[136] rather than playing a zero-sum game seeking only power. By expanding our knowledge of why, how, and when groups attack or choose not to attack civilians and by emphasizing the effects of ideology, we can perhaps learn to better protect civilians and, in some measure, 're-civilize' civil wars.

NOTES

1. On definitions of civilians and immunity, see H. Slim, *Killing Civilians: Method, Madness, and Morality in War* (New York: Columbia UP 2008) pp.9–36.
2. See S. N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (New York: Cambridge UP 2006, p.54, footnote 5) on the increase in civilian deaths in all 20th century wars and the higher proportion of civilian deaths in civil wars.

3. L. Balcells and S. N. Kalyvas, *Did Marxism Make a Difference? Marxist Rebellions and National Liberation Movements*, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the APSA, Washington, DC, 2–5 Sept. 2010; S. N. Kalyvas and L. Balcells, 'International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the End of the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict', *American Political Science Review* 104/3 (2010) pp.415–29.

4. While one could argue that neither Frelimo nor the MPLA won a military victory, both succeeded in taking power after independence, and as H. Kissinger, 'The Viet Nam Negotiations', *Foreign Affairs* 47/2 (1969) p.214 wrote, 'the guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win'.

5. This paper does not examine the MPLA's continuing conflict with Cabindan separatists.

6. M. Humphreys and J. Weinstein, 'Handling and Manhandling Civilians in Civil War', *American Political Science Review* 100/3 (2006) pp.429–47; J. Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence* (New York: Cambridge UP 2007).

7. Kalyvas (note 2) p.17. While some consider colonial wars as a separate category, I agree with Kalyvas (note 2) p.19 that they are civil wars, especially as native troops fought in Portuguese counterinsurgency efforts in Angola and Mozambique.

8. A. B. Downes, 'Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: The Causes of Civilian Victimization in War', *International Security* 30/4 (2006) p.157.

9. See E. J. Wood, 'Armed Groups and Sexual Violence: When is Wartime Rape Rare?' *Politics & Society* 37/1 (2009) pp.131–61.

10. Slim (note 1) p.173.

11. See J. Gerring, 'Ideology: A Definitional Analysis', *Political Research Quarterly* 50/4 (1997) pp.957–94.

12. K. Knight, 'Transformations of the Concept of Ideology in the Twentieth Century', *American Political Science Review* 100/4 (2006) pp.619–26.

13. M. Seliger, *Ideology and Politics* (London: Allen & Unwin 1976) in Gerring (note 11) p.959.

14. Competing theories of civil war violence and their potential applicability to my cases are discussed further in the conclusion.

15. Humphreys and Weinstein (note 6) p.432.

16. See also Wood, 'Armed Groups and Sexual Violence' (note 9).

17. See S. N. Kalyvas and M. A. Kocher, 'How Free is Free-Riding in Civil Wars?' *World Politics* 59/2 (2007) pp.177–216.

18. Weinstein (note 6).

19. S. N. Kalyvas, 'Weinstein, J. M. (2007). *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press' [book review], *Comparative Political Studies* 40/9 (2007) p.1147, likewise argues that the economic rationale of Weinstein's (note 6) theory should be able to apply to both insurgent and state forces.

20. M. McGovern, 'Popular Development Economics – An Anthropologist among the Mandarins', *Perspectives on Politics* 9/2 (2011) p.350.

21. C. J. M. Drake, 'The Role of Ideology in Terrorists' Target Selection', *Terrorism and Political Violence* 10/2 (1998) pp.53–85; V. Asal and R. K. Rethemeyer, 'Dilettantes, Ideologues, and the Weak: Terrorists Who Don't Kill', *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 25/3 (2008) pp.244–63.

22. J. Goodwin, '"The Struggle Made Me a Nonracialist": Why There was So Little Terrorism in the Antiapartheid Struggle', *Mobilization* 12/2 (2007) pp.193–203.

23. See S. H. Barnes, 'Ideology and the Organization of Conflict: On the Relationship Between Political Thought and Behavior', *Journal of Politics* 28/3 (1966) pp.513–30.

24. G. A. Fine and K. Sandstrom, 'Ideology in Action: A Pragmatic Approach to a Contested Concept', *Sociological Theory* 11/1 (1993) p.27.

25. For example E. J. Wood, 'The Social Processes of Civil War: The Wartime Transformation of Social Networks', *Annual Review of Political Science* 11 (2008) pp.546–47.

26. Marxism–Leninism is also associated with specific military doctrines of guerrilla warfare.

27. D. Keen, *The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars* [Adelphi Paper No. 320] (New York: Oxford UP 1998) p.33.

28. S. Machel, *Sowing the Seeds of Revolution* (London: Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola & Guiné 1974) p.16.

29. See also Balcells and Kalyvas (note 3).

30. M. Caldwell, 'Revolutionary Violence in a People's War', *Social Scientist* 3/12 (1975) p.44.

31. P. Hollander, 'Research on Marxist Societies: The Relationship Between Theory and Practice', *Annual Review of Sociology* 8 (1982) p.333.
32. Kalyvas and Balcells (note 3).
33. Balcells and Kalyvas (note 3).
34. Wood (note 9).
35. Drake (note 21, p.71) notes that 'communist' campaigns require that 'ideology and strategy [be] adapted to local conditions'.
36. L. Balcells, *Behind the Front Lines: Identity, Competition, and Violence in Civil Wars*, unpublished PhD Thesis, Yale University (2010); Humphreys and Weinstein (note 6); Weinstein (note 6).
37. Documents on Frelimo are drawn from the archival file with call information as follows: *S. Fundo:* SC; *Série:* SR; *No. de processo:* 2826/62; *Unidades de instalação:* 3213–24; *Título:* 'Frente de Libertação de Moçambique – Frelimo'.
38. Documents on the MPLA are drawn from the following archival files: *S. Fundo:* Del A; *Série:* PInf; *No. de processo:* 11.15.A; *Unidade de instalação:* 1832; *Título:* 'Movimento Para a Libertação de Angola – MPLA'; *S. Fundo:* Del A; *Série:* PInf; *No. de processo:* 110.00.30; *Unidades de instalação:* 2545–62; *Título:* 'MPLA'; *S. Fundo:* Del A; *Série:* PInf; *No. de processo:* 120.15.05; *Unidades de instalação:* 2703–04; *Título:* 'MPLA – Organização Militar'.
39. S. Hug, 'Selection Bias in Comparative Research: The Case of Incomplete Data Sets', *Political Analysis* 11/3 (2003) p.258.
40. J. Earl, A. Martin, J. D. McCarthy and S. A. Soule, 'The Use of Newspaper Data in the Study of Collective Action', *Annual Review of Sociology* 30 (2004) p.67.
41. See T. H. Henriksen, *Revolution and Counterrevolution: Mozambique's War of Independence, 1964–1974* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press 1983) pp.137–39.
42. Weinstein (note 6).
43. J. J. Ziemke, *From Battles to Massacres*, unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Wisconsin, Madison (2008).
44. C. Raleigh, H. Hegre, J. Carlsen and C. Ormhaug, *Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED) Codebook* (Oslo: Center for the Study of Civil War, PRIO 2006) p.22.
45. C. Andrew and V. Mitrokhin, *The World was Going Our War: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World* (New York: Basic Books 2006), p.446.
46. B. Munslow, *Mozambique: The Revolution and its Origins* (New York: Longman 1983) p.92.
47. C. L. Manning, *The Politics of Peace in Mozambique: Post-conflict Democratization, 1992–2000* (Westport, CT: Greenwood 2002) p.49.
48. L. De Brito, 'Une relecture nécessaire: la genèse du parti-État FRELIMO', *Politique Africaine* 29 (1988) p.19; T. H. Henriksen, 'Marxism and Mozambique', *African Affairs*, 77/309 (1978) pp.441–62; T. H. Henriksen (note 41) p.151. However, these transformations were not uniform across the liberated zones (see A. de Bragança and J. Depelchin, 'From the Idealization of Frelimo to the Understanding of Mozambique Recent History', *REVIEW* 11/1 (1988) pp.102–3).
49. L. Vail and L. White, *Capitalism and Colonialism in Mozambique* (London: Heinemann 1980) p.396.
50. M. L. Bowen, *The State Against the Peasantry: Rural Struggles in Colonial and Postcolonial Mozambique* (Charlottesville: Univ. Virginia Press 2000) p.50.
51. FRELIMO, *FRELIMO: La Situation Presente de la Lutte* (Waterloo: Comité Contre le Colonialisme et L'Apartheid 1974) pp.8, 12.
52. Machel (note 28) pp.64–5.
53. PIDE/DGS SC SR 2826/62, vol. 2, pp.2–20, 'Organização Político-Administrativa da FRELIMO nos Concelhos de Macondes e Macomia' (14 Dec. 1967) p.8; Munslow (note 46) p.140.
54. PIDE/DGS SC SR 2826/62, vol. 5, 'Frente de Libertação de Moçambique – Frelimo' (Nov. 1969–Sep. 1971) pp.15–18.
55. Henriksen (note 41) p.121.
56. PIDE/DGS SC SR 2826/62, vol. 10, pp.2–7, 'Actividade Terrorista em Moçambique' (11 Dec. 1973) pp.3–4.
57. B. F. Jundanian, 'Resettlement Programs: Counterinsurgency in Mozambique', *Comparative Politics* 6/4 (1974) p.523.
58. PIDE/DGS SC SR 2826/62, (note 54) vol. 5.
59. H. G. West, 'Voices Twice Silenced: Betrayal and Mourning at Colonialism's End in Mozambique', *Anthropological Theory* 3/3 (2003) pp.343–65.

60. PIDE/DGS SC SR 2826/62, vol. 4, pp.104–7, 'FRELIMO. Retrospectiva da crise política interna' (23 Aug. 1969) p.104.
61. PIDE/DGS SC SR 2826/62, vol. 4, (note 60) pp.416–31, 'FRELIMO Relatório de Comando IN' (31 Dec. 1968) p.426.
62. Ibid. pp.427–8.
63. Wood (note 9).
64. *Jeune Afrique* 9 Feb. 1974.
65. J. Hanlon, *Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire* (London: Zed Books 1984) p.45.
66. M. Cahen, *Mozambique: La Révolution implosée* (Paris: L'Harmattan 1987), p.58; C. Geffray, *La Cause des Armes au Mozambique* (Paris: Éditions Karthala 1990); Weinstein (note 6) p.236.
67. See, e.g., O. Roesch, 'Renamo and the Peasantry in Southern Mozambique: A View from Gaza Province', *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 26/3 (1992) pp.462–84; H. G. West, *Kupilikula*, (Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press 2005); H. G. West and S. Kloeck-Jenson, 'Betwixt and Between: "Traditional Authority" and Democratic Decentralization in Post-War Mozambique', *African Affairs* 98/393 (1999) pp.455–84.
68. Roesch (note 67) pp.465–6.
69. Henriksen, 'Marxism and Mozambique' (note 48) p.457.
70. Roesch (note 67) p.466.
71. For example P. Virtanen 'Defining the "Other": Democracy in Mozambique Within – A Historical Perspective', *African and Asian Studies* 2/3 (2003) pp.233–58.
72. G. Derluguian, 'Social Decomposition and Armed Violence in Postcolonial Mozambique', *REVIEW* 13/4 (1990) pp.439–62; Geffray (note 66) p.219; C. Geffray and M. Pedersen, 'Nampula en Guerre', *Politique Africaine* 29 (1988) pp.36–7 argue that Renamo simply provided the violence that made preexisting conflicts within visible. However, while some Frelimo policies were unpopular, people did not rush to join Renamo, with most early recruits coming from the leadership's Ndau ethnic group (T. Young, 'The MNR/RENAMO: External and Internal Dynamics', *African Affairs* 89/357 (1990) p.505; W. Minter, 'Inside Renamo, as Described by Ex-participants', *Transformation* 10 (1989) pp.22–3; J. Schafer, 'Guerrillas and Violence in the War in Mozambique: De-socialization or Re-socialization?' *African Affairs* 100/399 (2001) p.219).
73. H. D. Nelson (ed.), *Mozambique: A Country Study* (Washington, DC: Foreign Area Studies, The American University 1984) p.283; Africa Watch, *Conspicuous Destruction: War, Famine & the Reform Process in Mozambique* (New York: Human Rights Watch 1992) pp.19, 28–9; W. Finnegan, *A Complicated War: The Harrowing of Mozambique* (Berkeley/Los Angeles: Univ. California Press 1992) pp.121–2.
74. G. Seibert, 'The Vagaries of Violence and Power in Post-Colonial Mozambique' in J. Abbink, M. de Bruijn and K. van Walraven (eds) *Re-Thinking Resistance: Revolt and Violence in African History* (Boston: Brill 2003) p.272. Frelimo generally referred to Renamo as 'bandits'.
75. Africa Watch (note 73) p.43.
76. C. Nordstrom, *A Different Kind of War Story* (Philadelphia: Univ. Pennsylvania Press 1997).
77. Nelson (note 73) p.268.
78. J. Cabrita, *Mozambique: The Tortuous Road to Democracy* (New York: Palgrave 2000), p.208.
79. Schafer (note 72) p.219.
80. Finnegan (note 73) p.66.
81. Ibid. p.227.
82. E. Kingston-Mann, *Lenin and the Problem of Marxist Peasant Revolution* (New York: Oxford UP 1983) p.189.
83. M. Hall and T. Young, *Confronting Leviathan: Mozambique since Independence* (Athens: Ohio UP 1997) p.202.
84. Weinstein (note 6). In two incidents, both FAM and police were implicated as perpetrators.
85. Fewer incidents of violence are reported here than were included in Table 1 on independence war violence, but the difference in sources used renders these tables not comparable in terms of the overall number of violent incidents involving Frelimo in each war.
86. Weinstein (note 6) p.211. This figure is given by Weinstein as the percentage of Frelimo attacks out of 1,389 total incidents. However, in the data Weinstein provided in June 2008, I found 78 incidents of Frelimo violence against civilians out of a total of 1,400 incidents, yielding a responsibility rate of 5.6 per cent.
87. R. Gersony, *Summary of Mozambican Refugee Accounts of Principally Conflict Related Experience in Mozambique* (Washington, DC: U.S. State Department 1988).

88. M. Cahen, 'Check on Socialism in Mozambique: What Check? What Socialism?' *Review of African Political Economy* 20/57 (1993) p.58.
89. Weinstein (note 6).
90. R. Cornwell, 'The War for Independence' in J. Cilliers and C. Dietrich (eds) *Angola's War Economy: The Role of Oil and Diamonds* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies 2000) p.45.
91. P. Chabal, 'Angola and Mozambique: The Weight of History', *Portuguese Studies* 17/1 (2001) p.226.
92. Andrew and Mitrokhin (note 45) pp.444–5.
93. J. Fortunato (ed.), *Angola: Documentos do MPLA, 1º Volume* (Lisbon: Ulmeiro 1977); T. Collelo (ed.), *Angola: A Country Study* (Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress 1991) p.31; I. Brinkman, 'War, Witches and Traitors: Cases from the MPLA's Eastern Front in Angola, 1966–1975', *Journal of African History* 44/2 (2003) p.308.
94. Already in November 1961 the FNLA's predecessor, the *União das Populações de Angola*, massacred 20 members of an MPLA supply group (PIDE/DGS Del A PInf 11.15.A, p.385, '4762/61-S.R'. (20 Dec. 1961)).
95. J. Marcum, 'Lessons of Angola', *Foreign Affairs* 54/3 (1976) pp.411–2.
96. See Fortunato (note 93) pp.141–4.
97. PIDE/DGS Del A Pinf 11.15.A, (note 94) pp.138–9, 'Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (M.P.L.A)' (21 May 1962).
98. I. Brinkman, *A War for People: Civilians, Mobility, and Legitimacy in South East Angola during the MPLA's War for Independence* (Köln: Köppe 2005).
99. Ibid.
100. Brinkman (note 93) p.310.
101. Ibid.
102. PIDE/DGS Del A Pinf 120.15.05, UI2703-2704, vol. 1, pp.92–106, 'Operação "Diagonal"' (1 May 1970) p.100.
103. For example PIDE/DGS Del em A Pinf 110.00.30, vol. 7, p.135, 'Actividades do MPLA' (17 Nov. 1966); PIDE/DGS Del A Pinf 110.00.30, vol. 8, p.180–1, 'Actividades do MPLA' (17 Jan. 1967).
104. *Mentalização* entails convincing someone or molding and conditioning someone's opinions toward a desired end.
105. PIDE/DGS Del A Pinf 110.00.30, vol. 19, p.264, 'Actividades do MPLA' (11 Jul. 1970); PIDE/DGS Delegação em Angola Pinf 110.00.30, vol. 19, p.257, 'Actividades do MPLA' (17 Jul. 1970).
106. PIDE/DGS Del A Pinf 120.15.05, UI2703-2704 (note 102) pp.92–106, 'Operação "Diagonal"' (1 May 1970) p.100.
107. PIDE/DGS Del A Pinf 110.00.30, vol. 27, p.73, 'Actividades do MPLA' (17 Aug. 1974).
108. J. Ciment, *Angola and Mozambique: Post-Colonial Wars in Southern Africa* (New York: Facts On File 1997) p.41.
109. I. Brinkman, 'Ways of Death: Accounts of Terror from Angolan Refugees in Namibia', *Africa* 70/1 (2000) p.6.
110. Collelo (note 93).
111. Collelo (note 93) p.236; Ciment (note 108) pp.59–60.
112. Collelo (note 93) pp.231, 255.
113. Ziemke (note 43) p.126, emphasis in the original.
114. Weinstein (note 6).
115. P. Fauvet, 'In Defence of the MPLA and the Angolan Revolution', *Review of African Political Economy* 6/15–16 (1979) p.148.
116. Ziemke (note 43) p.74.
117. T. Hodges, *Angola: From Afro-Stalinism to Petro-Diamond Capitalism* (Bloomington/Indianapolis: Indiana UP 2001) p.13.
118. Ziemke (note 43) p.36. For anecdotal accounts, see K. Maier, *Angola: Promises and Lies*, 2nd ed. (London: Serif 2007) pp.117–27.
119. See above (note 44) for definition.
120. P. A. Schrodt and J. Ulfelder, 'Political Instability Task Force Worldwide Atrocities Dataset' (Lawrence, KS: Univ. Kansas, updated 8 Jan. 2009, online at <http://web.ku.edu/~keds/data.dir/atrocities.html>, accessed 7 Oct. 2009.
121. Landmine deaths and one duplicate are excluded.
122. On Portuguese violence, see, e.g., J. Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, vol.1 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1969); G. J. Bender, *Angola Under the Portuguese* (Berkeley/Los Angeles: Univ. California

Press 1978). On FNLA and UNITA violence see Brinkman (note 109); A. Malaquias, *Rebels and Robbers: Violence in Post-colonial Angola* (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet 2007).

123. Despite the increase in incidents of violence, however, there was not a shift toward engaging in more brutal violence.
124. Wood (note 25).
125. Humphreys and Weinstein (note 6); Weinstein (note 6).
126. Kalyvas and Balcells (note 3).
127. For example B. Harff and T. R. Gurr, *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1994); C. Kaufmann, 'Intervention in Ethnic and Ideological Civil Wars: Why One can be Done and the Other can't', *Security Studies* 6/1 (1996) pp.62–101; T. R. Gurr, *People Versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press 2000).
128. B. Valentino, 'The Causes of Mass Killing and Genocide', *Security Studies* 9/3 (2000) p.47; J.-P. Azam and A. Hoeffler, 'Violence Against Civilians in Civil Wars: Looting or Terror?' *Journal of Peace Research* 39/4 (2002) pp.461–85; B. Valentino, P. Huth and D. Balch-Lindsay, '"Draining the Sea": Mass Killing and Guerilla Warfare', *International Organization* 58/2 (2004) pp.375–407.
129. Kalyvas (note 2).
130. Ziemke (note 43) p.34.
131. L. Hultman, 'Battle Losses and Rebel Violence: Raising the Costs of Fighting', *Terrorism and Political Violence* 19/2 (2007) pp.205–22.
132. Models for this study would be W. D. Henderson, *Why the Vietcong Fought* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press 1979), who uses interviews with Vietcong ex-combatants to assess their experience of the Vietnam War, or Humphreys and Weinstein (note 6), who employed a nationally representative survey of ex-combatants in Sierra Leone.
133. T. P. Wickham-Crowley, 'The Rise (and Sometimes Fall) of Guerrilla Governments in Latin America', *Sociological Forum* 2/3 (1987) p.492.
134. I. Arreguín-Toft, *How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict* (New York: Cambridge UP 2005), p.225.
135. Frelimo and the MPLA, especially the latter, have taken more authoritarian turns in the past decade, but their election victories have been legitimate.
136. Balcells and Kalyvas (note 3).
137. J. M. Weinstein and L. Francisco, 'The Civil War in Mozambique: The Balance Between Internal and External Influences' in P. Collier and N. Sambanis (eds) *Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis*, *Volume 1: Africa* (Washington, DC: The World Bank 2005) p.166. Reprinted with permission from the publisher, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank.