

of striking non-military objectives, and dragging out the conflict indefinitely. The author's conclusion is that the databases do show a widespread application of asymmetric strategies in post-1945 conflicts, but their true impact must be assessed through qualitative methods in each individual case.

This qualitative analysis is undertaken in chapters 3 and 4, where Deriglazova applies her asymmetric conflict model to two significant post-1945 conflicts. Military scholars will be disappointed reading these chapters: there is no mention of population control, oil-spot strategy, or people-centric and enemy-centric counter-insurgency. Deriglazova writes political science, not military history or strategy and tactics; the questions she answers begin with 'why' and not with 'how to'. For her case studies she has selected the dissolution of the British Empire and Dominions and the US experience in Iraq between 2003 and 2011.

The book does have some flaws. To start with, of the two case studies, I found the second one (Iraq) far more convincing than the first. Britain's retreat from its dominions, colonies, and protectorates was a long and messy process, involved many small and not so small armed conflicts on four continents, and touched the lives of something like a billion subjects. Squeezing it all into a single case study is certainly an ambitious enterprise, but not a very satisfactory one. The author's purpose would have been better served if she had selected one conflict and analysed that in greater detail. Deriglazova has also decided to confine her inquiry to asymmetric conflicts in which the more powerful (state) party was defeated. Academic freedom certainly allows her to do this – nevertheless, I would have liked to see her model applied in at least one more case study, in which the stronger party prevails over the challenger. Those looking for the new or unexpected in the bibliography will be disappointed, and although the author is meticulous in citing her sources (there are thirty seven pages of endnotes), the usual comprehensive listing of the works the author consulted is missing.

That having been said, one does not have to agree with every conclusion or approve of every aspect of the methodology to appreciate the merits of a scientific work. This certainly applies to Deriglazova's book: compared with its merits, its flaws are really negligible. It should be on the shelf of every scholar of military or political science, because it provides not only a useful analytical tool, but also a solid theoretical foundation to its use.

**The Battle for Mozambique: The Frelimo-Renamo Struggle, 1977–1992.** By Stephen A. Emerson. Solihull, England: Helion; Pinetown, South Africa: 30° South. 2014. 240 pp. + 16 pp. b/w photos. £19.95 paperback. ISBN 978 1 909384 92 7

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The study of the Mozambican Civil War has returned to pressing relevance since 2012 when the former rebels, Renamo, broke their pattern of peaceful involvement in politics and returned to training armed cadres, precipitating a series of ambushes and clashes with government forces that continue to the present day. Though Stephen A. Emerson finished his study before the reignition of hostilities, his history of the conflict offers new

material to understand both the history of the civil war and the background to current events.

Much of the literature on the Mozambican Civil War has been written by sympathizers of either the Frelimo government or the Renamo rebels, with their biases shaping the subsequent understanding of the conflict. Emerson, a former Southern Africa analyst for the US Department of Defense, mentions this problem and misinformation in some previous accounts of the war as motivations for his own work, which he says 'attempts to set the record straight and provide an accurate – as best one can – military history of the war' (pp. 8–9).

The book begins with a brief overview of the history of Mozambique and Frelimo's war for independence from Portugal in the 1960s and early 1970s. Though the focus of the book is the later civil war, this section is too brief, as it neglects an opportunity to delve deeper into the roots and character of Frelimo, which in turn contributed to patterns of Renamo support and recruitment in the civil war. Some of this information is presented later in the book but feels out of sequence. Emerson's account of Frelimo's early political programme after independence suffers from bias itself, describing Frelimo's 'radical', 'ruthless', and 'restrictive' socialist policies (p. 25), while neglecting to mention that the organization's leadership was pushed further towards Marxism-Leninism and the Soviet orbit by US refusals to engage with Frelimo in good faith or show any flexibility. These are minor issues, however, given the book's primary concern with the advent and dynamics of the civil war.

The core of the book is its examination of the origins of Renamo and the roles played by Rhodesia and subsequently South Africa in shaping and supporting the rebel group, with an emphasis on correcting prior misconceptions. On the basis of an interview with a former Rhodesian intelligence officer who helped train Renamo, Emerson argues against previous accounts that Renamo emerged largely from *flechas*, native counter-insurgency units that fought for the Portuguese, claiming that only a small number of former *flechas* were actually incorporated into the nascent Renamo (p. 35). Emerson seeks to change perceptions of businessman Jorge Jardim as directly involved in the creation of Renamo, pointing out that he was instead associated with earlier pro-Portuguese paramilitary groups begun with future Renamo leader Orlando Cristina (p. 37). Emerson also interrogates the reported 1980 shoot-out between Renamo commanders Alfonso Dhlakama and Lucas Mhlanga, concluding that no shoot-out occurred and Mhlanga was not killed, though there was a dispute and Mhlanga was imprisoned (pp. 76–7).

Chapters 3–6 of the book are especially useful for new information they provide on the involvement of foreign actors in the war. Though accounts of the involvement of Rhodesia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe in the war exist, rarely have they been examined in such depth in a comprehensive description of the war. Zimbabwe's role in propping up the battered, poorly trained, and poorly motivated Mozambican armed forces in the latter half of the 1980s is especially good. In the final chapters Emerson conveys very clearly the grinding nature of the war and the problems faced by both sides. His brief concluding section on the aftermath of the war, about the stability of peace, now reads as overly rosy, but few could have predicted before mid-2013 the sustained nature of the renewed conflict in Mozambique.

Emerson does an excellent job of introducing new sources and information to the historiography of the war through his interviews with not only Frelimo and Renamo fighters, but also Rhodesian, Zimbabwean, and South African military veterans and other foreign observers, and through his use of Rhodesian and Zimbabwean archives and Renamo documents. The book falls a bit short, though, of its ambitions to provide a balanced and unbiased account that overcomes the pitfalls of previous volumes. Though Emerson's work cannot be characterized as pro-Renamo, several sections rely almost exclusively for sourcing on pro-Renamo historian and journalist João Cabrita's *Mozambique: The Tortuous Road to Democracy* (2000). There are also no interviews with high-level Frelimo officials to balance out the perspectives of top Renamo leaders Dhlakama and Raúl Domingos, and Mozambican archival sources are not examined. The first half of the book tends to focus more on Renamo at the expense of understanding the Frelimo side of the story early in the war, although this is corrected later on. Although it is impossible in any case to find and cite every relevant source, Emerson does not examine the articles of Margaret Hall (*Africa*, 1990), Carrie Manning (*Journal of Southern African Studies*, 1998), and Otto Roesch on the origins, structures, and membership of Renamo, or, though they are in French, the very important works of Michel Cahen and Christian Geffray. These sources could have further informed Emerson's account of the war.

In the final analysis, while Emerson has not written the complete or definitive military history of the Mozambican Civil War, he has written one of the best accounts yet, especially for those scholars interested in the roles of Mozambique's neighbours. The inclusion of new sources and detailed attention to specific aspects of particular engagements, logistical issues, and military training make this book, despite a few caveats, an engaging and essential read for those interested in the Mozambican Civil War, and of interest to scholars of Southern African history and Cold War-era conflicts more generally.