
Due to space limitations in the main text of the article, this appendix provides additional relevant references related to specific events and issues. This aims to ensure proper credit is given to authors who have informed our analysis, especially Nicaraguan journalists and scholars who have been continuing to undertake crucial reporting and research in perilous conditions.

**On how Ortega’s experience as a prisoner of the Somoza regime may have shaped his thinking and political behavior, see:**

**On the background of the FSLN and the Nicaraguan Revolution, see e.g.:**

**On the international circumstances of Nicaragua’s Revolution and the Contadora peace process that ended the Contra War in the 1980s, see especially:**

**On Ortega’s efforts to consolidate power in the FSLN around the first party congress in 1991, see:**

**On splits in the FSLN and the formation of the Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS), see especially:**
On the Ortega-Murillo family’s media and business empire:
Drazen Jorgic and Ismael López, “Ortega Media Enrich First Family, Squeeze Rivals across Nicaragua,” *Reuters*, November 23, 2020,

On anti-canal protests and attacks on them by riot police:

On Murillo’s threats to censor social media in March 2018, see:

On the Indio Maíz fire protests in 2018 ahead of the mass uprising, see also:

On protests and the subsequent crackdown by pro-government security forces in Jinotega in 2018:
Sara Ruiz and Isela Baltodano, “Esta es la razón por la que la Policía no reprime a los manifestantes en Jinotega,” *La Prensa*, June 5, 2018,
Luis Eduardo Martínez and Eduardo Cruz, “La guerra no contada de Jinotega,” *La Prensa*, September 15, 2019,

On repression and state violence in crushing the 2018 protests, see e.g.:

On judicial repression of protesters and opposition from 2018 on, see e.g.:

On the continued efforts of the Ortega-Murillo family to consolidate control over media outlets and government repression of independent outlets, see:

On Ortega and Murillo’s monitoring of government employees and demands for political loyalty from them, see e.g.:

On Ortega and Murillo’s erratic, limited response to the COVID-19 pandemic, see e.g.:

On new laws passed in 2020 to target the Nicaraguan opposition and disqualify electoral challengers:
On Nicaragua in comparison to Central America’s ‘Northern Triangle’ and recent resemblances between Ortega and other authoritarian-minded regional leaders, see e.g.: Forrest D. Colburn and Arturo Cruz, “Trouble in the ‘Northern Triangle,’” *Journal of Democracy* 27, no. 2 (2016): 80.


On the Bukele government’s efforts to spy on independent journalists and hack their phones in El Salvador, see:


On Ortega and Murillo’s recent relations with the Central American Integration System (SICA) and Central American Bank for Economic Integration (BCIE) see:


On the show trials of government opponents beginning in February 2022, see e.g.:


On government moves beginning in February 2022 to cancel the legal status of independent universities and confiscate them, see:

Divergentes, “Daniel Ortega Confisca de ‘Manera Encubierta’ Las Universidades Canceladas,”
*Divergentes*, February 7, 2022,

Confidencial, “Más de 18 000 Estudiantes Afectados Por Confiscación de Seis Universidades,”
*Confidencial*, February 9, 2022,
https://www.confidencial.com.ni/nacion/mas-de-18-000-estudiantes-afectados-por-confiscacion-de-seis-universidades/.

**On the death of political prisoner Hugo Torres on February 12, 2022:**
Confidencial, “Fallece Hugo Torres, preso político de Ortega y Murillo en Nicaragua,”
*Confidencial*, February 12, 2022,